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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RULON R. WEST,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 9870

TERRY R. WEST 1and
FLORA E. WEST,
Defendants and Respondents.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
PLEkDINGS
Plaintiff and appellant shall hereinafter he
referred to as "Rulon". Defendant and respondents
Terry West and Flora West will hereinafter be referred to as "Terry" 1and "Flora".
"Ex." shall refer to Exhibit, "P", to paragraph, and "R", to Record.
Rulon's complaint in the first count sets forth
verbatim paragraphs 6 and 12 of the partnership
agreement between Rulon, Terry and Flora, R. 1,
involving 1a motel operation called El Rancho enter1
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prises and hereinafter referred to as El Rancho. A
copy of the agreement is attached to Rulon's complaint, bearing the date, "October 19'57". P 6 of
said agreement is as follows:
6. ·The net profits of the business shall be
divided between the partners in the following
proportions: Rulon R. West, forty percent
( 40 7o) ; Terry R. West, forty percent: ( 40 7o) ;
and Flo~a E. West, ·twenty percent (207o);
and the partners shall in like proportion bear
all losses, including loss of capital.
P 1'2 is as follows:
12.
If * * * the partnership shall be determined or expire during the joint lives of the
partners, then the partnership shall he wound
up, and the assets distributed in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof.
Rulon's complaint a'lso has attached thereto
Ex B, R 5, wherein the attorneys for Rulon in writing demanded a winding-up of partnership affairs
and a distribution to be made to Rulon of 407o
in accordance with P 6 !and 1'2 as pled in said complaint. Said Ex B, R 5 over signature of Rulon's
atorney, reading in part as follows:
''Your partnership agreement provides that
"if the partnership shall be determined or
expire during the joint lives of the partners,
then the partnership shall be wound up, and
the assets distributed in the proportions set
forth in paragraph 6 above hereof." Paragraph 12. Paragraph 6 provides for a forty
percent ( 40%) ·distribution to your father."
( E·mphasis Supplied.)
.
2
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Terry filed an answer and counterclaim to
Rulon's complaint in which Terry 1asserted that he
entered into the partnership agreement in good
faith and left school, gave up all other ambitions
and endeavors in consideration of the promise of
Rulon to make all ·capital investments and contributions with ·the understanding that should Rulon decide to wind up affairs and force an involuntary
winding up onto Terry, that 'Rulon would transfer
to Terry 40 7o of all the capital investments and
!advancements made and Rulon would have only
407o of everything returned to him, R 14, ·p 2.
·Terry also alleged in said answer and counterclaim that pursuant to the notice of winding-up
served upon him and identified as Ex B, R '5, at~
tached to -·Rulon's complaint, that T·erry entered
into a dissolution agreement, which is 1attached to
Terry's answer and counterclaim, identified as Ex
2, R 19 to 2'2, and 'Terry also pled and attached to
said answer and counterclaim, Ex 1, R 18.
Ex 1, R 18 is pled and clrui'med as conclusive
evidence of Rulon's carrying out his intention to
take only 40% of everything or all interest in all
assets .of El Rancho with the balance of all assets
and all interest, 407o to gog to Terry ·and 20%
to go to Flora.
In said Ex 1, R 18, over Rulon's sign1a.ture,
appears,
3
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"1. The contribution made by Rulon R. West
with respect to the 40ro interest acquired
by 'Terry R. West was and is a gift from Rulon
R. West and Rulon R. West does agree to
file a gift .tax return in connection herewith
so stating". Ex 1, R 18.
"2. * * *"
a3. iT'he undersigned, Rulon R. West, further certifies that the interest in El Rancho
enterprises were not only a gift to 'Terry R.
West but :also to Flora E. West and their
i~ter.ests were acquired by virtue of a gift.
(Emphasis supplied)'.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ·2nd day
of April, 1960.
·
(S) Rulon R. West
Terry also pled estoppel as against Rulon, al~
leging that Rulon was estopped ~to 1assert otherwise
R 1'5, P 10.
Flora filed her answer in which she alleged
that she was entitled to 20ro of all assets and everything, including contributions under and by virtue
of 'P 12 as set out in plaintiff's pleadings R 1 and
further that Rulon had so intended, ·should he force
a winding up. See R 2·9, P 7. Flora further alleged
that said 20 tjo was a transfer to her and was made
conclusive under the agreement of April 2, 1960,
which agreement is identified as R 18. See R 30,
P 9 of her answer so !alleging. Flora also pled esstoppel, R 30.
Rulon filed a reply to the answer and counter4
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claim of Terry wherein Rulon admitted the e:x:ecution of Ex 1, R 18 wherein it was asserted by Terry
and Flora that it constituted conclusive evidence
of a complete transf\er of 407o of everything and
all interest to 'Terry :and 20% of everything to Flora,
and Rulon raised as the ONLY defense to said Exhibit, that it was without consideration.
Rulon next moved the 'Court for a Summary
Judgment, representing to the Court and alleging
and specifying,
"'There is no genuine issue of any m~aterial
fact * * *". with respect to the issues in said first
cause, see R 3'8, and that Rulon was entitled to
judgment thereon as a matter of law.
1

Terry, after the filing of the motion for Summary Judgment, but before hearing thereon, filed
an affidavit under oath, alleging that the consent
to the dissolution was entered into with reliance on
the declaration that Rulon would have returned to
him only 40.7o of everything in accordance with
his letter of March 121, 19 60, wherein Rulon agreed
to take only 40 7o and Rulon having so pled. See
R 44 for the Exhibit, :also R 5 and see R 40 to 44
for 'Terry's ~affidavit. 'In said affidavit, Terry further alleges that the dissolution was to be concluded
with Rulon to get only 40 7o of everything as declared in P 6 and 1'2 df ~the contract R 1 and the
election R 5 to wind up made by Rulon in his at1

1

5
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torney's letter of March 21, 1960.
Said affidavit further alleges that 'Terry entered the partnership with the express understanding that it was the intention of the partners that
should Rulon force an involuntary winding-up onto
Terry, that Rulon would receive back only said
40 7o. Rulon did not either deny or put at issue said
affidavit or object to the Court's receiving same in
evidence.
Counsel for Terry moved the Court that all
depositions be published, which motion was granted
by the Court R 107-12 and that all pleadings, ~affi
davits, interrogatories and answers to interrogatories also be considered 'by the Court and received
in to evidence, as well as all other pleadings, which
motion was also granted R 110. Rulon's counsel
made no objections to any pleadings, admissions,
affidavits, exhibits or any objections of any kind.
Rulon's counsel then moved the. Court for a
Summary Judgment, wherein he admitted everything
in the affidavit, since it was not denied, and he still
represented to the Court that there was no genuine
issue of any material fact with respect to the said
first count, and he made no objections to pleadings
or evidence or affidavit. The Court entered its judgment R 110 to 112, resolving the issues in favor of
Terry and Flora, which judgment constitutes the
basis of this appeal.
6
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FACTS
'Terry changed all future plans and left all future ambitions to go into a new field and operate
El Rancho, the subJect of said partnership, and he
did so for Rulon, :at Rulon's request and with the
express understanding that Rulon would advance
all capital and that Rulon could not at his whim
and after sacrifice and change of position m!ade
by ·Terry and when the business was built up, terminate 'Terry's interest in the partnership with ;Terry
being thrown out of his occupation and forced to
change position again, unles's Rulon's withdraWlal
from all assets, including all capital contributions
and advancements was made to be limited to only
40% and lall of the 'balance, 40 7o to go to Terry
and '20% to go to Flora. SeeR 1, P 6 and 12 wherein Rulon himself has pled said contract ·so asserting.
Moreover, this was part of Rulon's estate planning
being carried out by his attorney's to avoid inheritlance taxes on a half million dollar estate.
Terry, in good faith, went into and operated
the motel. When Rulon elected to wind up, Rulon
served notice that he elected to wind up in accordance with P 12 by asserting in his letter drafted
by his attorneys and identified as ·Ex "B", attached
to Rulon's complaint R 5, wherein he claimed only
40% was to be returned to him, moreover the sworn
evidence before the Court which was not even con7
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tradicted or objected to was that Rulon supplied
the capital and Terry gave up his future plans and
all understood in order to protect Terry, 'Terry was
to have said 40% distributed to him as indicated
in P 12, R 1. See Terry's deposition page 21. The
same attorney who drafted the notice for Rulon R
5 also appeared and was present representing Rulon
when Ex 1, R 18 was discussed and executed, wherein Rulon made conclusive his intentions of withdr-awing only 407o, with the balance of everything
40 7o to go to Terry and 20 7o to go to Flora. See
R '101-20 for admissions by Rulon's counsel in this
respect.
ARGU'ME'NT
POINT 'I
·THE APPE:ULATE COURT WILL NOT REVERSE
THE iiOWER COURT WHERE 'THERE IS SUF'Fl'CIENT EVI'DENCE TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S POSITION.
1

1

'The fact that Rulon agreed to file a gift tax
return, which was never denied, constituted an admission of a completed and executed gift and showed
his intention on this issue conclusively. Since the
above evidence 1and all other facts and pleadings recied as considered by the eourt is not only sufficient to sustain the Court's decision but conclusive
on the issue, counsel deems it unnecessary to further
e'lucidate the subject.
8
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PO:rN·T II
HAVING REPRESENTED 'TO THE COURT THAT
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AND
HAVING NO DENIAL TO THE AFFIDAVIT, EXHIBITS OR EVIDENCE AND MAKING NO OBJ·ECTTON
TO HAVING SAME RE CEIVED IN EVIUE NCE, THE
DOWER COURT WAS REQUIRED TO A:CGEPT ALL
EVIDENCE AS TRUE AND RESOLVE THE ISSUES
IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.
1

1

Justice Henroid, in the case of Lab co Gons·truction vs. Caldwell, 382 P. '2d 206 ____ U ____ , stated:
"For this court to reverse the trial court under such circumstances would deify a mockery of our rules and pre-trial procedure".
Counsel suggests that the Court consider the
application of the same rationale to the case at
bar, ~:nee after taking the position that there was
no genuine issue of fact, and submitting the same
to the Court, to then complain because the ruling
was adverse is even worse than action taken in the
~above-quoted case.
Again this is so elementary and obvious, counsel sees no necessity for citing further authorities
in this respect. Moreover, counsel is estopped from
asserting that certain facts may be in dispute when
he himself represented to the Court that there were
no facts in dispute.
POINT II'I
NEW MATTERS CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN THE APPELLATE COURT.

The only defense pled or raised by Rulon to
9
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the contract, the election to take only 407o and to
the conclusive evidence set forth in Ex 1, R 18 and
the 1affidavit was that Ex 18 was without consider-

ation.
R 18 was executed and delivered to 'Terry in
compliance with and to conform to P 6 and 12 of
the contract as pled by Rulon R 1 and also conforming to his election and notice to wind up and take
only 407o of everything, R 5. Moreover, the partnership contract provided that 'Terry would undertake operations with the understanding tha:t a transfer of 40 7o of the entire interest to 'Terry and 20 7o
to Flora of everything would be made by Rulon if
an involuntary winding-up was forced on Terry.
Rulon elected to force a winding-up and declared
his intention to take only 407o of the entire interest, and Ex 1, R 18 was executed and delivered to
Terry wherein Rulon under advice o fhis attorney
signed a statement that his 40 7o contributio nto
El Rancho was a gift to Terry and Flora and he
certifies thereto. All terms of the agreement R 6
to 10 demonstrate ample consideration, as does the
letter R 5 and election of Rulon to take only 40%;
demonstrating Rulon's intent and understanding
with respect to said P 6 and 12 of ~the contract.
1

Moreover, when Rulon agreed to file a gift tax
return, he conclusively demonstrated an unequivacal intention that he intedned a gift and that :all
10
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acts had been accomplished to make ilt completely
executed, completed and transferred.
Even if Ex 1, R 18 had not been given in fulfillment of commitment and even la~ked 1aH the
strength !and considerations of conforming to and
completing the matter in accordance with the contract P 6, 1'2, R 1 and the election R 5 and had the
Court ignored all· of said evidence and ignored affidavits and 1all else, the Court would still have been
compelled to resolve the issues as it did for the following reasons: The defense, by admrtting R 18 and
by pleadings raising one issue only, and only one
defense thereto, to-wit: no consideration with respect toR 18, which is what counsel for Rulon did,
the lower court must still be affirmed.

NO CONSIDER.NTION IS NECESSARY:
Reed vs. Knudson, 15 P. 2d at ·349 80 U. 4;28,
"no consideration is necessary to support an
executed gift".
See also 24 Am. Jur. 758 ''5'3 Generally. It is
a general rule that a completed gift inter
vivos is irrevooable by the donor, his heirs,
and personal representatives, and is not revoked by the property being mentioned in a
will. A gi'ft inter vivos from parent to child,
when fully executed, is irrevocable. A gift
cannot be revoked on 'the ground that it was
made under a mistake".
Counsel in desperation not in pleadings or in
evidence before the lower Court but for the first
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time before this Court asserts some impropriety in
the execution of Ex 1, R 18, despite the :Dact 'that it
was done in accordance with the requests made by
Rulon's attorney in his estate planning program
and drafted in compliance with the understanding
with Rulon's attorney and discussed, considered and
executed by Rulon at the requests of the !attorney
of Rulon and in the presence of Terry, Rulon's attorney, and Terry's attorney R 101. Moreover, since
impropriety of execution was not pled, it cannot
now he raised for the first time in the Supreme
Court, even if it were proper to raise such issue and
even if there was some justification to 'be heard on
said issue~ Here it has been demonstrated thlat even
if such issue had been properly pled and considereq
and even if the Supreme Court was to re-try the
fact, which of course it cannot, still the issue must
be resolved as it was, and the lower court affirmed.
1

In bringing up King Lear and Santa Claus,
appellant is deliberately trying to conceal the fact
that in estate planning of Rulon's half million dollar
estate, what was done by the firm representing
Rulon !and appellant was proper, including the
$80,000.00 'the daughters got in ·stock.
ANSWER TO APPELLAN'T'S BRIEF
The answer to Point I of Rulon's brief 48-8-37
Utah Code Annotated, 19 5'3,1 provided as follows:
1

12
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"In settling accounts between the partners
after dissolution, the following rules shall be
observed, SUBJECT TO ANY AGREEMENT
TO THE CONTRARY." (Emphasis supplied).
The part to which emphasis is supplied is a
complete answer to the point raised by appellant,
since there have always been three agreements to
the contrary: (First) P 6 and 12 of the contract
R 1, (Second), notice and election of winding up
R 5, ('Third), dissolution agreement and agreement
of transfer of Rulon's interest by gift and promise
to file gift tax return, making it conclusive, R 18.
Moreover, P 12, R 1 would he surplusage and
completely meaningless unless i't is considered as
compelling Rulon to distribute, when winding up
under said circumstances, 40ro to 'Terry and 20ro
to Flora of all ,capital investments and advancements.
'Throughout the brief of the appellant, he refers
to "'accountant Terry". We appreciate the fact that
appellant has conceded the qualifications of Terry
West in this field. The greater portion of the brief
of appellant is an attempt on the part o'f counsel
for appellant, Mr. Roe, to qualify himself as an !accountant.
"Accountant Terry" suggests that from an accou~ting standpoint, Mr. Roe, who is ndt an accountant, h!as demonstrated in his brief that he is not
13
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qualified to advise this Court on the subject for the
following reasons.
Appellant's argument that ''liabilities to partners" includes contributions to capital is patently
incongruous. Section 48-1-1'5 (UCA, 19'5'3) requires
each partner to be "repaid his contributions" after
"!all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied .... " If, "liabilities to partners" includes "contributions" to capital, these contributions will be
satisfied when the liabilities of the partnership are
satisfied and 1there will be no ''contribution" left to
he ·'·'repaid". Clearly, as used in Section 48-1-1'5, the
expression "[liabilities] to partners" was used in
its ordinlary sense of a debt liability such as that
arising from money actually loaned as a creditor
and not in the technical, legal sense of a contribution made by a partner as capital.
The position of !appellant that the money paid
by Rulon was a loan is directly contrary to the prohibition against such a position as made and provided for in the partnership contract itself, wherein ~:rt states at 3B, R6, as follows:
1

1

"3'B. Any further sums which any partner
shall with the consent of the other from time
to time contribute for capital purposes which
shall be credited to his capital account."
No evidence was before the Court showing any
modification of said controlling accounting procedure.
14
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By Appellant's own admission ·(Appellant's
brief, p. 9), 1all sums contributed by any partner
were in fact credited to his capital account. This
procedure was strictly in accord with Partnership
Article 3 (b) which requires that all contributions
of a partner for capital purposes shall be credited
to capital accounts. Such procedure was followed at
all times prior to the Dissolution Agreement of
April 2, 1960. Clearly, then, as understood by. the
parties, the sums contributed were capital contributions and not "loans" or "1advances".
H'Owever, in an effort to bolster his argument
for repayment of his so-called "loans" or "advances",
Appellant urges that the sums he ''advanced" were
bona fide "loans" to the partnership and thus Appellant qualifies as a creditor of the partnership,
notwithstanding the fa~t that such a contention is
contrary to the uniform practice of accounting by
the partnership 1and the plain meaning of Partnership Article 3 (b) . Obviously this is an attempt to
bring such sums contributed by Rulon within the
category of "liabilities to partners" as that term is
used in UCA §48-1-3'7 since Appellant states [Appellant's brief, p. 34] that ''There is no reason to
suppose that the parties meant to adopt a different
meaning for "liabilities to partners".
Unwittingly, no doubt, Appellant has cited to
the court the precise reason why the parties could
JG
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not conceivably have intended to use those terms
in the manner in which Appellant 'says they are
used in the Utah Code. The Code sweepingly includes as liabilities of the partnership not only bona
fide loans made by partners, which admittedly would
be liabilities of the partnership, but also all capital
and profit iaccoun ts. In other words, there never
could be any ''net assets" as that term is used in the
Agreement of April 2, 19'60, if Appellant''s contention is correct. "Net assets" means assets remaining after payment of liabilities, and the logical
conclusion of Appell!ant''s argument is that all capital and profit accounts would have to be closed
as if they, too, were true liab'iHties of the partnership.
But clearly such an interpretation was not intended by the parties since they expre~ssly stated
that after '''pa~ing all partnership liabilities (including liabilities to partners) ," the "net assets"
should be di stribu ted to the partners. By using the
term "net assets", the parties obviously intended to
confine the term "liabilities to partners" to the customary accounting meaning of actual deht such 1a;s
liab'ili ties to outsiders.
Following Appellant's contention would require
that Rulon's contributions to capital be deemed liabilities of the partnership in the same sense as
liabilities to creditors, thus leaving nothing for the
1

1

16
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term "net assets" to act upon. Such an interprertation would render that term meaningless, notwithstanding it is otherwise defined by dictionary, accounting texts :and case law. In Kohler, A Dictionary
for Accountants, 278 ( 195'2) the term "net 1assets"
is defined as ''the excess of the book value of the
assets of an accounting unit over its liabilities to
O'utsiders." '(Emphasis added.) In Webster's Int.
Dictionary 1·6'6, (2d ed., 19'53) net assets equals
"the eX~cess of value of resources over liabilities to
creditors as distinct from surplus which is in excess over all liabil~ties, including those to owners." In Montgomery, Auditing 382 (8th ed.
1H57), "capital" is used by accountants to describe the equity of an owner in a business and
is represented by the excess of total assets over
total liabiHtie~s which equals "net assets". In Commonwealth v. Union Trust Go., 34'5 Pa. 29'8, 27
A.'2d 15, 18 (1'94'2), the court states, " The amount
of its net ·assets, constituting its capital, surplus
and undivided profits, is a bookkeeping balance obtained by substracting its liabilities from its gross
assets; 'it is the shareholders' equity in the assets
of the company." 'The court in Oram v. Kirchik, 58
NYS.2d 431, 433 '('Sup.Ct. 1945) gave a 'simHar
definition.
1

Moreover, where a partner contributes capi~tal
and leaves it in the partnership for use by the part17
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nership in its business, such capital is not the same
as an ordinary debt df the partnership. As was stated
in Seaboard Surety Co. v. H &R Construction Corp.
1'53 F.Supp. 641, 649 ( 195'7), "'This amount is due
them not as an unpaid cred~tor hut as a return of
capital."
Although courts often speak of the return of
capital 'as a debt of the partnership, it is in no sens,e
a conventional liability of the partnership unless it
is a 'bona fide loan or advance but is merely a distribution of capital among the partners according
to a written agreement or understanding derived
from the whole situation. See Hunter v. Allen, 14'7
P.2d 21'3 (1'944). All of the Appellant's cases purporting to show that there should be a return of capital are factually di'stinguished from the present
case in which we have an express agreement decreeing the percentages in the distribution of capital
upon dissolution, as well as a factual situation completely consistent with the written agreement.
Furthermore, Appellant argues that Respondent is bound by the Agreement of April 2, 1960.
If Respondent is bound, so likewise is Appellant
who must then abide by the plain meaning of that
document a:s well 1as the dbvious understanding of
the parties as evidenced by the accounting procedures and practices prior to April 2, 19·60.
Even assuming, arguendo, AppeHant's strained
18
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contention that '''liabilitie's to partners" include partners' cap:i!tal and profit accounts, how does this help
Appellant? He cannot take an expression out of conte~t from one of the agreements which supp1emen t
the Articles of Partners11ip because it benefits his
position, hut arbitrarily reject the remainder. If,
therefore, the expression "lia:bil:ilties to partners" is
to be accepted, so also should the provisions !adjusting the capital accounts to reflect the transfer of
capital from Rulon to Terry and 'Flora. Once this
is done, it is immaterial whether Appellant's theory
is adopted or not, since payment to partners will
automatically he 'made on a 40-40-'20 basis because
the adjusted capital accounts will be in that ratio.
Respectfully submitted,
E. L. Schoenhals
MARK, JOHNSON,
SCHOENHALS & ROBERTS
903 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendants and Respondents
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courts

proceed with

-u ascertain and :::tPV':f
· _-~ · lust ~,s t1esi~u -·l~ :1at _... _
0 · · ceed w1th equal dispatch to a~.,
''iClpk:.; m c Ul 'i ' tc .: :w~L:J !- __
,
undisputed facts; and, since we fl~l
rj,;_>,! t o p 'C\ : 1e <'_; __y so·:1:
"~' .() 1964'~a~on ~hy the Supreme Court s:wahi r!'-~- ve in :,,nu d
r1~J.tk \ .
S\,.
diStinCtiOn between law and l'QUlty a:'! Y.i:'·:~~a td " Sl'' tm · __ -y .l L~ '
~.L\&RA~~~, .~e conclude that it neither· inttcndr oi t li!' ,_k n,
i.E: :

i'

,.·._ - ~ -- ~8 t~ undisput~d fact._'"i

3

This is not to say that a court m.ust alw;~:,l· ~ r .r c
1L:
summary judgment in an action sef' ~dn;,~ '':.
ly because there is no dispute as to il K~ f~:i(:
seems inappropriate, the court can l't'lus;:' L~
, .J'J t.
might do after a trial. But if there are ,: .··~·· 2J · ~.
court believes equitable relief appropr·iat'f\ i.'. i~·
:·
to grant a motion for summary judgrru::nt

t

l'

n
s
t,

c

LiE

eJr.
:lC . .

~h'V.£::1\: ·

.

_?lie{.

§ 1233. Time for Motion
As originally adopted, Rule 56(a} p rov h:~z:~;H H n. p,, , / S£:' ;_'l.
ing to recover upon a claim, countf?'rda iw , (Yt _(:, ,_ et ... l c_,,.
obtain a declaratory judgment might nto~/ r·
,:; •! · r: · ., , ".::.: ..
ment at any time aft~r a responsive pleading ·1·d ex· : . ;c; :> rJ~<Under this provision a pJaintiff could not ~rH ' • ~
.o - ·-~:;mLi'
judgment until after tne. aeieii(fiU.if ·-r1·a;tr·~-.';--_f7~TI ·-'" ]''""~~·;~;"~~-~~~; ..
pleading to the com2l~!!l.~ Where a defcr··r~:-~tl'. ·.nn- ,_, : :r suL··
mary judgment before answer plaintiff cou~,J ,
ter motion for summary judgment untn ~-q h.
~·r ·),;;
served. 33 In an interpleader action one (k;f;;·.wlr!
: n:.;Jr o
for summary judgment until after the olh :
'l
_::.ri . :_ ;: _
swered their claim. 16
By the amendment to Rule 56(a) the r,wnvh:i
changed to allow a party seekiflg'to r{?COI!J,:• n· r.g
31.21 J<~llas v. Manis, Tex.Clv.App.
1956, 292 S.W.2d 836, 838.

@

33 ,

Vlld"' '::.

li"rn,·,

.l '~ . Y. H~, ~-'1 ,

v.

"·

·d.

::<.

Declalona under former rule

Begnaud v. White, C.A.Oth, 1948, 170
F .2d 323.

;!I. k'P-1 '1 q '

Pe :Jpk•3

Peoples Bank v. Federal Re8erve
Bank of Han Frands<'o, D .C.Cal.
1944, 58 F.Supp. ~:-;. appeal dlH·
missed Hi) F.211 KJO.
U. S. v. Williams S. Gray & Co., D .C.
N.Y.1945, 59 F .S npp. ~>fl .

>.;{,

ii :;.nd;

h< ::, ~

ijtd ll ,1!. u!r

il.i

Wl-l , ;·,-! U"
mlc::;t·: i 1\·:!·iJ·

.34"

H _ ~·'.
.ii !Jn, ·r

,'(

n· r.;:

•· !l•'!,

Kent v. Hanlln, D.C .Pa.1040, 35 F.
Supp. 836.
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i·ercia·n
:--:: -- ::::-::-::.~=-=- ::. :=.3claratory judgment..!Q..
•novr · · summary judgment at any time after the expiration
0 _ -~~ · "- vs · ..<:J1 the commencement of the action or after serv~ll motiortf'Oi~ surririrtiryJ'U(fgffieil't~'by' the
~party.
Trw A/visory Committee Note states that this amendme!!l il.J.£.
;IY' : n' res~ of more expeditious litigatior-: and that the 20 day
r Nk·d o:l vrs a defendant time to secure counsel and determine
'\mtlr___ of actJOn_!U.i Such an mterval 1s unnecessary 1I detend<r:Jt -~:- "''···lf mo\es for summary judgment. 35 Therefore a claim;; is no lmt~·r required to wait for a responsive pleading by
1i:-: ad' crsary ~~yfore moving for sumn.:ary judgment.

ad'verse

Apr-· - .galnst whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
or a dr-daratory judgment is sought may, under Rule
~(~(b), rnnv::' for a summary judgment at any time. 36 A defending
m3.y make the motion at any time after a pleading statilg B. c · 'im a,gaanst him is served upon him. 31 A defendant is not
;'pfmiru to ~He an answer before moving for summary judgment _:~r
the court may require a defendant to file an

;l~~srrtfr-1

'i.i
-·~,;

.. .,_l.i:w!x ; his ~how>; a·n ex.,f ,. -:11 i<tll- ll.1~'" a !liStilll!llii<lled

, ·;til~·•
I

JH•ars tllat no valid claim against hlrn

U. S. v. William ~. Gray &
l'o., 1U'.X.Y.W-l:>, C.O F.Supp. f~.l3.

exists.

.·;;r i\•i,;·i:-:or,r C<>l!ltnitft:>('

'ld" llii

qff( '

!Jf.

yPt

UlllH'CPpt Pd--

e:t\ L' · trqm~t·n; if Hllynne C'ollld
P'.l'r sll<·'·
lillY pn•,·ipitntP artion in
:tit_\- lrHI c; •i! 11, off~~>t tlw Ill< IT'~> usual

38.

i'

1~:3

,::J,, d(•l:1,r~ But at a11y rate
:; ... i'~'·" •ion i.-1 iwn~." Clark, The
tlll>:w -Ttid;;;'llt>llf, 1952. :3f\ :\linn.L.
i,,t··'l'lllin

I\

\

:i:\i

Gifford v. Tran~]('rs l'rotpctiYf'
A~s·n

of Amf•ri<'a C.C.A.!lth. 10-40,

F.2d

~OH_

Lind~PY \'. V>avy. C.f' .. \.f)th, l!H:>. 149

l<'.:.!tl 8H9, certiorari dP!Ji•·d t;f; S.
Ct. 331, 32G F.S, 7'-:;{, :1o L.Ed.
474.

70.

MillPr v. International FrPig-lttillg
CIJrp., D.C.;-\ Y. w.-, 1, fl7 F.S11pp.
60.

Ath •try { \nn.ndtt.et~ Nqff". Ap-'·nillx,
:lllll' :1.".
For a nitil'isru
lilr r; ::•y , LIP<f·d hy tht• 11rigiual
i.;-,,,-;,-i·ni "I' dissn1tinr; opi11lon of
''il'('l!l' ·" c,J;y ':t:c ;)!- \n r- S. v. AdlPr's
~-l"Hill· 1'}. -r:.1'.A.2d
JH:H}, 107 l<'.~d

Sec11rity Trnst Co. of Rodtt•stt·r, N.
Y., v. Woodward, Jl.( '.N.Y. lfl-17,
73 F.Supp. GG7.

\i7. H!l~.

'1

.ir-n: '
!~:~

{: rr.,rd
()r

11

1:

,-

:!

,
,-i'.

:1 ''

a.

r:_,.~ .~.~-\.Uth, 1H·H·•, 10:.~

A dl'f< ndlrw; p11:r!y may mr'"" for
_;,J•l\!,nir·nt ~1! :1ny tiJJH· ~tft•·r
:• PI· a•;it1;: .' r·diJW a l'iaim again--:! hirn
j~ l'I'VPd "''Hi !lim )f It !'IP:t! /,1 lip· ., tr::r_j'

dPft>nd~nt'-;

tn<ltion
(I}J.

j!'ett·d to becaw--:1' no arr~\\'t•r l1nd hr·<-11

1'.2d ~·· "

r.

On

for summary jwlgtnPtJt, wltkh was

~Hl

v ''ra•' 'l'r: J"rotPdln• Ass'II
·\;:

Compare:

onnson fi Co., D.C.

filt•d, ddendnnt':; SIIPJI<Il'firr~ attid:tYit
roul<l he considt>rt•d i11 plit<'l· ,,,- antswer, or, it a fpnnal an.'-'\\'1'1' shrnrld
he rPqnirPd, it rrlil!ht hf' fil•·d hy
anrPtHltnl'flt at any tirrw, !'Vt•tr n ft Pr
ftnal .i•rd_gment. l~. ~- ('X rt·l. Lan;:;lllin , v. Eid1Pr, D.C D.C. Hl-li. :Jti F.
Supp. !l72.
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filing suit before February 15, 19-l7
sp<·citica
yrd tht· filinr, of such suit * * * was wrote defendant on February 15, 19-l/ as
reliance IIP· lll the good faith of the ue- to · the amount they would recommend to
i;t~iuns instituted hy and the assurances the Court as a settlement of the admitted
de by Mr. White through his attorney." debt, * • • " In the present state of the
e fllrq~oing statements are what this record this allegatiOn of fact has not Seen
demed. If appellee desues to controvert
11 1·ss would testify to if this case went
tri;11. Whether the jury would accept th1s allegation of estoppel he can do so
:h trstinHlil)' at its face value or reject by filing his answer upon the remand of
is not the present question. Taking it tiiTS- case, together with any other proper
its f:tce value on the motion for wm- defenses ava1lable- to him. On the issui
.ry judgmen t, it clearly puts in sharp or-issues of fact th~7;ffiaae:tflePartfe'S7re
ue thr defendant's claim that th( bank's entitled to their jury trial.
uidators did no t rely upon the repre•
Judgment of the District Court is re
1tations and negotiations of White.
versed and the case remanded for further
[6] The authorities indicate that the proceedings in accordance with the views
hereinabove stated.
al judge should be slow in passing upon
motion for summary judgment which
tuld deprive a party of hi5 righ,t to a trial
jury where theror; is m td'l!onable indi~a
n that a material fact is in dispute. Comre Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321

1

1

S. 620, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 LEd. %7,

wh~re

affid;r.vits of eight witnesses on hthalf
the dd~ndant ~ere, under the cireumnces in that Ca§ ~, insuffici<ent to authorthe Court to sustain ddendant's mon for summary judgment"

!

:1,8] T he fac~ that both parties make
rtions for summuy judgment, and each
ntends in suppoiii of his respective mon that no genuine isstte of fact exists,
es not require the Court to rule that no
:t issue exists. I~c h, in support of his
rn motion , may be willing to concede
rtain con!cnt ions of his opponent, which
ncession , however, is only for the purse of th t~ pending rnotiuno If the mon is overruled, the concession is no longeffective. 1\ p-pdlants' concession that
~enuine issue of fa ct exis~ed was made
support of its ow n motion for summary
igment. VJe do not think that the con;sion contin11es ov~ :r into the Court's seplle conside ration of appelleers motion
·summary judgment in his behalf after
Je!lants' motion was overruled.
M.
~wer & Co. '!· Un ittd States, 7 Cir., 140
.d 367 • 369 ; Waltmg v. Richmond Screw
Ichor Co., 2 Cir., 154 F..2u 780, 784.

HICKMAN v. TAYLOR et al.
No. 9579.

United States Court ot Appeal1
Third Circuit.
Argued June 25, 194&
Decided Oct. 18, 1948.
I. Death

~95(2)

In action by administrator for death
of a seaman, as to which the Federal
Employers' Liability Act was applicable no ·
recovery could be had for the economic
value of the decedent's life for the ~riod
of his probable life expectancy. Jones Act,
46 U.S.C.A. § 688; Federal EmployeTs'
Liability Act i§ l, 9, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51,

59.
2.

s.. mln

~29(f)

Where marine superintendent of railroad whose car float with freight cars on
board sank in river, arranged for removal
of cars from float by engaging tug owners
to tow car float to shipyard and superintendent merely assented to plan of tug OW'Q·
er whereby tug was attached to hawser of
sunken float during night and sunken float
fhe co~plaint stat~~ that the appellants, caused the tug to sink, railroad was not lia,..
)mg onSponsored
th~ negotnation~
appellee's
by the S.J. Quinneyand
Law Library.
Funding forble
digitization
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and Library
f~r death
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on board
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& cable had been sent to FernThere then was quoted in full the
i€' of May 15th, probably for the
son, a~ contended by FAR, that it
ld net bP certain that the May 15th
til· had bern received by Fernseh. In
ciu sio n, th e cable stated: "Our di1
tors ha' l' approved agreement (stop)
.ail.iil.l! your answer." This cable inatl'd that the necessity of a confirm! ('able had bC'rn eliminated and that
that was lacking -.vas Fernseh's acJ!ance. H seems clea r that Ferm~eh
O(' rs tood from the cable of May 28th
~L p, cnnlirming cable from FAR \Vas
lon~!'r necessary. Fe rnseh's cable of
ne Jtl th stated: "We accept your ofr in your ca ble of May 28, 1941. Conler abrogation of existing agreements
c1 mutual assignment of patents as
ndinR"." A fair :reading of this cable
ows that. F ~~ :rnseh understood that the
;t act n:·cesso.ry for consummating the
ansaction had been done. Also on June
th, Fernsrh cabled authority to Mr.
artin (patent attorney and secretary
FAR) to execute the formal assignent on Fernseh's behalf.
Fernseh
ould hardly have put such power in
AR's hancis had it not regarded the
mtract as complete. It cannot be gaintirl that at this stage of the correspondlee such an interpretation was a reamablr on e. Thus, the facts on and bene June 14, 1941, demonstrate that no
)nfirmatory cable from FAR was reuired to r.on~ummate the contract.

y J5Lh

ance was sent. This contention is well
founded. The general denials in defendant's answer put this question of fact
in issue. Moreover, it was brought to
the attention of the court below when,
at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, defendant stated:
"It is perfectly clear to me, Your
Honor, and I think the plaintiff will
have to concede it-that if the time
when the cable was sent is significant, there is an issue of fact as to
that. And if the court must decide
that question, then neither motion
can be granted. We take a view of
the case which suggests to us that
the question need not be decided and
that possibly, therefore, there is no
issue of fact."
F AR'e motion for summary judgment
was premised on the theory that the
correspondence between it and Fernseh
demonstrated that an assignment was
consummated upon the deposit by Fernseh of an acceptance cable with the German cable office on June 14, 1941, prior
to 1:10 P. M. (the effective date of the
Executive Order). It was essential,
therefore, to FAR's case that it be shown
that Fernseh's acceptance was sent before 1:10 P . :M. on June 14, 1941.

[ 4, 5] FAR argues on appeal, however, that there is not the slightest doubt
but that Fernseh's June 14th cable was
dispatched prior to 1:10 P. M. As
"clearly proving, this contention FAR
This conclusion is supported by the relies heavily on a detailed affidavit of
ubsequen t ad.s and declarations of FAR an expert from RCA Communications,
nd Fernseh.
Much argument was Inc. wherein the op£nion is rendered
ressed, pre a "d con, on this point, both that the cable was transmitted before
t the court ·:)e)ow and on this appeal.
1:10 P. M. on June 14th. But, although
lowever, th if·. phase of the casr~ has an affidavit filed in support of a motion
•een dPalt with by Chief Judge Leahy so for summary judgment may be considxtensively, artd with such particularity,
ered for the purpose of ascertaining
hat no more need be said here than
whether an issue of fact is presented,
hal his opinion in this regard is adopted.
it cannot be used as a basis for deciding
(3) Defendant finally contends that it the fact issue. Frederic Hart and Co.
vas error for the court below to grant v. Recordgraph Corp., 3 Cir., 1948, 169
lUmrnary judgment in favor of FAR F.2d 580.
In addition, it is obvious
1ince there was a genuine issue of fact from a reading of the affidavit that it
lS to the
timeby the
when
Fernseh's
_is nothing
more
than
an opinion.
SumSponsored
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. acceptFunding for digitization
provided by
the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

88-i::Ed.1b J.S

Other evidence is sim- mstrucuons t;O Ult:: lJlOH ·~" vv ...
r- ·.'!
ilarly pressed as substantiating this ceed in accordance with this opinion ...:I
point of FAR, but it is manifest that
even when this evidence is considered,
there remains considerable doubt as to
the truth of the matter. The law is
clear that one who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of
fact. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. ConINTERSTATE NATU!RAL GAS CO.
solidated Fisheries Co., 3 Cir., 1951, 190
v.
F.2d 817. FAR has not met the burden
SOUTHERN CALIF011tNliA G.i\8
CO. et at
here.
(6] FAR also contends that since defendant cross-moved for summary judgment, it is now precluded from questioning the propriety of disposing of the
case upon such a motion. But, it is
well established that cross-motions for
summary judgment do not warrant the
trial court granting summary judgment
unless one of the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
upon facts that are not genuinely disputed. Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 2 Cir., 1946, 154 F .2d 780, certiorari denied, 1946, 328 U.S. 870, 66 S.
Ct. 1383, 90 L.Ed. 1640; Begnaud v.
White, 6 Cir., 1948, 170 F.2d 323; Lloyd
v. United Liquors Corp., 6 Cir., 1953,
203 F .2d 789, '794. 6 Moore, Federal
Practice § 56.13 (2d ed. 1953).~
[7] In the instant case there was a
genuine issue of fact as to the time when
Fernseh 1s cable was sent, and accordingly the court beiow erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of FAR.
3. It wu there held that affidavits of eight
witnesses on behalf of the defendant were
insuffif'ient to sustain defendant's motion
for summary judgment.

4. In Brgnanrl v. White, 6 Cir., 1948, 170
F.2d 323, 327, the Court succinctly stated the applicable rule ns follows:
''The fact that both parties make motions for summary judgment, and each
contends in support of his respective mo·
tion that no genuine issue of fact exists,
does not require the Court to rule that
no fact issue exists. Each, in support

v

w

No. 13373.

United States Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit.
Dec. 29, 1953.

I

Action by natural gas compai .
against another such company, alleged\
obligated to transport as a carrier naq
ral gas belonging to plaintiff, for r~
fusal to so transport gas. The Unit~~· •
States District Court for the Southe ,
District of California, Central Divisic'
William M. Byrne, J., 103 F.Supp. 3lj
entered order granting defendant's rr~
tion to dismiss, and plaintiff ap{Jeah1
The Court of Appeals, Orr, Circd
Judge, held, inter alia, that questions ~
to whether public convenience and r~
cessity required defendant to transp<:l
thr?u~h its pi?elines gas belonging j ·
plambff, and If so, how much and
what rates, and as to what fncilities '
services should be abandoned to acco•
modate plaintiff, were within the p
mary jurisdiction of the Ft·deral Pov

!
1

1

of his own motion, mnv he willing- to'
concedl' ?ertnin r.ont.''·n.tiolls of his ot•JlO·~·
nent, wh1ch ('t•li<'CHHlOil, howt'\'Pr, ix nnh
for the purpu"c of th" JW!Hlin~ Hll>lr"J~ '1
If the motion is O\'f'rrtlit>d, tliP cotH'PS· ·
sion is no longer cfr.-f'l ivP. A ll!ll'll:ints
conCf';!Siou that no genuine iRH\11' of fael
existc•l wns made in supJ>ort of itA owr
motion for sumrnnry jndgntPnt. \YP d<
DOt think that thP COTICPHHion ('OiltilliH'I
over into the Court's fH'JlHrut•~ <'nn~idPr
ation of appellee's motion for ~nmn 1 ttr'
judgment in his lwhulf ufter uppellant~
motion was overruled."
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Glh ~idps moved for summary judgl. T h( • (·ourt granted motion for
11 t i'r,

"':'<',e findings of fact, conclu?i1d ·entered judgment. The
,; i·nc. n~· :nfrinJ.r ement and damages

1:1

r·~·

1.1 v.

e ,wt :, Lji :d ica t ed .

L 21

T h· · t riRl court exceeded the

1im its of ddermination of
q'o'\':-:' ;00 s \\'ithout trial. A mo-

miss;hl c

1

fo r ~.J r; 1 ·n ary jud).(mvnt cannot be

rtkd :1 im rtl :. because both sides move
i li ~ r ;ndisp ensable prerequisite

sut"h "" jwkment is the absence of a
leri ;1.l Gt:t.s: i o 11 of fa ct. But it is ob-

us lh;, 1t ~h : ! t> \\'~re postulates of fact
·oln-d :n u·, ': diam etrically opposite poion5 t• f the i·esp ecti ve litigants. Both
1teni.-icne. of fact could not be true.

E :f.: then said the proof was
?.·del was ail before the trial
1rt. U ~J, :. s were conce ded, there
·re still q• J ~':-:i ion:; of f<tct to be resolved
1ich ::.n <~PI~'·i l;tt e court is not permitted
adjudic otc·. Trial de novo , which was
rmeriy tiw rt.: le in a dmiralty , ecclesias:al cour t'l ar:rl in so me chan cery cases,
defi :-ti t ci: <Jt olish ed in civil cases in
e f.~ · oe: ?: ( 'C ~P ts ~JY th e rule~; constrictg re v1 ~~v:. J<i o a t-;l ho ri ty is given expt to Di~tri c:~ CouTt::~ tc. mak e new fmd~s of fact . ?n.. s ::nUy our 8ole fun<.:on a~ i~o :'lt".:b findi ngs if! to r e-examine
Jdici ali;·. cri ,;•cize an d set aside if
[3-7]

:um ~ :1iary

iR \\ •·II CRtab!i CJ hed tb u t
: '. r
litJl

.,c ;·: n t

·' ltttlnt ''"

· l 11 ~

f!•t i tttll !HJ

t ri nl

f'rJ nrt

gnwting
hf! muv-

i ''d >(' i!' ·Itt wdt•:-, :•. loll !' (Jf t

!':;~ ! ; 'P

.\ fin ,Ji;!l£ ·t ~l ·.: ~: stwPnr.ry )• ,dgment will
if : ;:e re i ::~ ditm1 .: ~ »hont th o
(; , •.t."
v: :~ • ·r2 aftn trilll tbe cottrt
11
''l~lt :-• 'lit ~ .. ,-j,;,.· we, d ' W>HJI!'! ,[ Ury HIJd te~·
' '""' ' lt !n : ·. ~hr; ·-~ iH 11 Ht 1 1111,_; polir \ [()r
.:dtirtlll > ~i··n 111: " •w·al, which iH cryHt a l!ilr.t~ d
In ll•tl•· ;-,:: . :•' r·· nal llules 1,( Civil l'rol'•'dl!r• · :,:.-.: :·. ~~r .A.
l11· Ad •:y!·5 ~

[S-lO] But it should not be conceived that this action is founded upon a
technicality. The lawyers for the respective parties, by the cross-motions,
superinduced the idea that no factual
questions were involved. But the utmost which can be said ill a patent \'alictity case is that it is a "mixed question
of law and fact." The implications of
this phrase are misleading.a It is realized that the learned trial judge took
this action under the pressure of a heavy
cale ndar and in order to save time for
the parties and attorneys. As often
happens, the shortcut did not accomplish the desired end. 6 In a patt>nt case
thf: re are three interested parties, the
patent holder, the user of an accused device and the public. The interest of tht'
3.

jud r, ment du

iro ;·ttitJ , d t11 jrtdgtll l: rtt 1!8 H
mHt t •·.- < · , ~·;
iJ"'" f :ll'l :; thai· Hre n1 1 t
~~ · nq ;. ,. :·
A. H . Li•i•ti,!Jiting
1 ' uqH· .,, ,; ,,. ·: l' r u•,; ,,. 1!. :\ C ir, : ~OB ~' . :!ri
Jj;,, :1 •·; J: .. r:,·:. ud
White,{) f)ir., 110
F . ~d >~ ~:s. :;:.2 7.
IIJK

y erroneous.
the basis of fact in documentary form or
in agreed statement of the parties does
not transmute such propositions into
questions of law. 3
It is true that all the facts mi~ht ha\·e
been stipulated. But even then, submission upon that basis would require a
trial. At the trial an opportunity should
be given to introduce evidence. Here,
as we understand the record, there was
an effort to present some testimony
which was precluded because it was indicated the nature of a summary judgment prevents the trial of any issue of
fact." No comment is required. The
case must be remanded for trial.

\\'aialua Agricultural Cotnp:111y v .

~lm.~·

jll, 9 Cir., 178 }f.2d ()()::. tiOS.

4.

Federal Hult·H of Civil l 'ron:d•Jr,. , .-.~i \d) .

5.

statPtn~>nt h11s ht• (•n ~iv"n PI·
dicially . "Tit•! qtt<•stion of in\·,.ution lwtt tt.;
a que~:~tion of far·t, to l> e dPtPrmitlPd, ltll\1
P\l'r, by ruiN~ of l11w . PoppPrrhlt~t'll \ .
Falke, ~'1 · rl . ( 'n~ . No.ll:! .'-AI, !'; Blall-ltf. [Iii 1
4Sl, we are t·nn!-itruined to hold the patPrtt
vnlid on a fact finding of inHntion in it~
sul,j Prt matter.'' Radiator Speciality ( 'u .
v. Ruhot, ~ ( ;ir.,
~'.:.!d :li;l,
At
the tim ~ of that opinion, th ere wus t ri:r 1
de novo in uppcllate courts iu pat••r•t

A dearer

:m

:nn.

cases .
6. S"P l>oP.hler Metal F'urnitnn~ Co., Inc., v.
T'nitf•d States, 2 Cir., 14!1 V:2d 1:10. 1;::-•.
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a r~ C(~ n ta in I J j 11 lll! :' I i c ~ r :J ' ~ i ~ •. : I r" l Jot i
ava il. No opinwn wa s hd.i ;f e t. h i:., Cc·urt. ·
There is ind1catiun n eith~r wh y t h •.· trial i
judge thought the d r vic ,· Wil :i a 1; in ven-:
tion !:or wh y t he pa k nl.{ d a l'ti •:k '>va :;
diffe n -ntiated from t.he p 1 wr a r c H is ;
well known that a single rut ·:' nt rn s been ;
upheld in one cilcuit and }~ t- ! d imalid in
anothn.D In a fanlOLH .:aw, L1e Supreme Court held a pHt en t invalid 10 .1
~

fallacious letters patent.
parties pla intiff and defendant cannot be
allowed to dictate the course of the litigation lest t.he public suffer.
[11 , 12] Because of the peculiar
character of the process of reconsideration bra court in a fteld where presumption of validity of an administrative
finding h:1s, to say the leaRt, been weakt>ned,s any tendency to abolish trial in
patent cases for consideration of documents w camera should be curbed. Furthe rmore, apparPntly as a direct result of
tht' im propel' failure to hold a trial, the
fin d in ~' of fact whic-h were made were
,.n; i rr!: inaJequate. H Pre again, the
l:t'-V ',-•:· 2 '2 t-m to have preRented the court
':,Jth f.,nrali:-:tic pr,moun c:e m ents of "ultimate fad ,'' ·whi ch a re in effect concln !-:io n ~.
An adrn :n ist r ati''e g r z1r·t uf le ·
te r~ wr r-i ·c~ s >1 pr es umption o:· \'a! i it~
l: ut does not state on its f ace tne L '· e n
t.ion involved or differentiate the device
from earlier patent or contrivances already dedicated to the public.

when attention wa " call ed to a d evice
which ltad been in 1h r rnd· ic dom jn for ~
many years pri or i o the :ll les-ed inven tion, alth ough it ha d r ~ rcvi,HJ:;.ly sus- ~
tained th e identic:tl p at ~·r ~ t ill ;:, prior ., ·
case w here thi~:-: evid e r1c • ~ ul aJ1t. k "pation
was lacking. In t.he inl 2r e::; t of the public, the impol'tanee of a s r)pcifk declaration on the contested iss u~s br the trial ~.
court eitlwr in op im.·o ll ;:: 1.· in fn ding:' :.•
1
ca nno t
be overe mohas ized.n Oth t' r - ~
.

w~Is~ ,

1
J. h . b d
.
..
L_1f' . ur..en. 1s. p.ta ceu

•

h.

·-,

o r~ r.. l.- ~ . t. o~ r. :.

~
1
·.·

•)1 •• ryi!1~ pat e1• (. Ul 'S\~~ ' fi. the nn~c l!1- .
stAnc E: rath er t:han exerc 1s ing t he normal
function of review.
'!

The summary judgmr n i: ia v::.c;:U·d, th;:.;
petition for dedaratory ..·eiief !2; rein[13, 14] The court must find facts stated and the cau:ie r eman ded fo r trial ~
which support three essentials: novelty, and appropriate and spcc iik fin d ings of
utility and invention. Mere conclusions fact.

···,j.•i

is the public intr.r est which is
dvm inant in the patent system." Mercoid
Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co., 320 TJ.K OG1, 665, 64 S.Ct. 268,

1. "It

:!71, 88 L.Ed. :: 46.
8. See ~Iy e rs v. Beall Pipe & Tank CorJIO·
ration, D .C., 90 F .Supp. :..>f)5, 268.
9. Conflicting views of appellate courts con·
cerning the validity of the same patent
l1as led tlw Supreme Court to grant cert ,o rari in man.v cases.
For example,
~ e e Jnngerscn v. Ot>itlJy & Barton Co.,
·:: :i U-8. 5(i0 G9 S Ct ''G9 9'~ L .f'd 'J:J')·
I 1 )'.1 \'l>emie~l Co. ·v. ii:llibu~ton. Oij \~· ~Ii
1
.';,ru enting Co., 324 U .S. 320, f.l5 ~.Ct.
G47, 89 L Ed. 973; Uui venm l Oi.l Pr oduct~t
Co. v. G !obe Oil & R efi ning Co ., ~{:''2 U.S .
·Hl , 64 8 .Ct. 1110, 8A L.Ed. 13!>9; Cuno
F:ngint~eriug Corporation v. Automatic
Dcviees Corporation, iH4 U.S. 84, 62 S.
Ct. :.n. 86 L.Ed. 58; Maytag Co. v. Hur-

lc~·

Machine Co., 3u·,- C .~; 24::s, 15!) KCt.
Bm, 83 L.Ed. 126·1. See ubw 'I' : lnlett
v. Lmvell, 297 U.S. o:~s. Yifi !i .Ct. 8·1:1, RO
L.l~ci . 949.

In &uch c nst~a I• e rfo rc e. t!w
Supreme Court e :r e r (' i ~ed ·!n iud e p e:ud ent
fn11ction in relt.1 ; i" "~ t r: i ,. ' : ~.

10. Se.- Smith Y. Hnll. · ·:~)! -:; •; . ·
Ct. 711, 81 L !·;d. lfH !J
,: ~ ,,
Snow, 294 U .S 1 , r>!~ ~3 \' . ·Js .• z;,
721.

entuule inv-enti(ln ;"
~. Vl (,
I~~" I. L ( ''~~I
DOt lll Hrel y to ()J!:(liir•r:tft) th G dt ~: t'ltdnnt,
but to relit ~\ e th•.J pul1l1C fr o111 a n 11 ss, · rt 1 ~ d
lJ\ () flf> IHi ly
•
u." I!auY,h l')' ''· L 1·,·.
151 U !::i . :O: H:.:!, ~ .'ii'i , 14 ~. Ct. :::: 1, ;c::!.
38 L.l'id. 1H~. It iu iHq~t ~ ru ti\ e t hat ! hi'
court·s do uot recPii' P. twlunilol..: io n of Sl!< 'h
coutrovers iPH on 1111 iuu d •• •p1 a t. 1· lt n:{i,1 lil id
I)

by intPr('~tecl partie~:.
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